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This is an appeal frotn a decree of the District Court of
Sanpete County granting to the respondent, Sanpete Water
Users Association, an extension of time for a period of two
years within which to file proof of appropriation on water
application No. 9593. The suit in which the decree was entered
was filed to review a decision of the state engineer finding
that the applicant had shown diligence and granting an extension of time for filing proof. The Sanpete Water Users
Association will be referred to in this brief as the {(applicant."

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Application No. 9593 was filed by John L. Bench on
September 11, 1924,. to appropriate 15,000 acre feet of water
from Gooseberry Creek in the Price River drainage for storage
in a reservoir to be constructed at the site described in the
application as the {(Narrows." The application propose~ the
construction of a tunnel to carry the stored water from the
reservoir in the Price River drainage through the mountain to
lands in the San Pitch River drainage in Sanpete County where
it would be used for irrigation purposes. (See Exhibit 3.) It
was assigned to the Cottonwood-Gooseberry Irrigation Company on April 15, 1948 and from that Company to the Sanpete
Water Users Association on April 17, 1950. (Ex. 4).
The application was rejected by the state engineer on
May 18, 1925. An appeal to the District Court from the order
rejecting the application was filed within 60 days thereafter.
The application and the action for review lay dorrnant fo1' a
period of 11zore than 14 years. The case was finally tried and
a judgment was entered directing approval of the application
4
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on February 11, 1939. (See Ex. 2). Since then the applicant
has filed requests for extension of time to make proof on the
following dates:
August 26, 1943
September 4, 1948
August 29, 1950
March 11, 1953
March 11, 1958
The 1943 request recites that more than $20,000.00 had
been expended for. exploration work and surveying. This was
done by the Bureau of Reclamation at the Bureau's expense.
(See Ex. 30).
The state engineer granted an extension to September 5,
1948. In 1948 the Cottonwood-Gooseberry Irrigation Company
(then owner of the application) frankly admitted that, tCNo
work has been done on real construction.'' (See Exhibit 31.)
Nevertheless, the state engineer granted an extension to September 5, 1950.
The 1950 and 195 3 requests are· identical, with respect
to the description of work done, both mentioning the surveying
and test drilling, and again referring to the $20,000.00 spent
by the Bureau of Reclamation to explore and survey. (Exhibits
5 and 6). The state engineer granted additional extensions to
March 11, 195 3 and March 11, 1958. (Exhibits 5 and 6).
The 1958 request, which is relied upon to support a further
extension, incorporates by reference the information contained
in the 195 3 request, and then says that this statement will be
limited, ((to the nature and extent of work done since the
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date of the last extension." This very appropriate assertion
is followed by ( 1) a quotation from the report of the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, ( 2) a statement that
certain gauging weirs were installed along the San Pitch River,
( 3) a discussion of the failure of Congress to appropriate
funds for the Gooseberry project, ( 4) an assertion that the
applicant has made a feasibility study of the project on a reduced basis and that applicant has applied to the Utah Water
and Power Board for $180,000.00, ( 5) rr On February 21,
1958 applicant commenced work to gain access to the tunnel
site, and on March 5, 1958 actual excavation for the tunnel
was commenced/' and ( 6) a statement that ((The Bureau of
Reclamation has expended $20,219.00 since January, 1953 on
continued investigation.
The applicant states that a ((reason why the extension
should be granted," is that since it appears that no federal
funds are immediately available, ((the applicant must finance
the project through personal resources" and such assistance as
it may obtain from state and federal agencies. It is stated that
it will take some time to accumulate all of the necessary funds.
(Emphasis added.)
A hearing was held on the 1958 request for extension of
time and thereafter the state engineer granted an extension
to January 31, 1961 with the warning that tea request for an
extension of time submitted at the end of the period now
granted ·must be supported by evidence of substantial progress
toward construction of the project contemplated by the application" (R. 8).
The evidence introduced at the trial consisted of (a) a
6
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map showing the locations of the dam site described in the
application, and the Mammoth site (Ex. P-1); (b) the District
Court file in the case in which the Court directed the approval
of the application (Ex. D-2); (c) application No. 9593,
(Ex. D-3); (d) assignment of application No. 9593, (Ex.
D-4); (e) requests for extension of time (Ex. D-5, 6); (f)
letters, minutes and engineering reports (Ex. 7-22, 33); (g)
testimony of efforts made to get federal and state assistance
to construct the project (Tr. 61, 62, 65, 87, 89); (h) testimony
regarding construction work (Tr. 154-164); (i) testimony
regarding the feasibility of the project (Tr. 220-229, 251252); and (j) testimony reg~rding the length of time required
for engineering studies to determine the feasibility of the
project (Tr. 243-248).
The witnesses, McAllister and Jensen, called by the defendants, testified (Tr. 77, 87-92) regarding the many efforts
made over the years since 1936 to get the project authorized
and financed by a state or federal agency. These included the
following:
1933-Bureau of Reclamation Report (Tr. 106)
1936-Requests of assistance from the Utah Water Storage
Commission (Tr. 87)
1936-Requests of help from W.P.A. or P.W.A. (Tr. 62,
S7, 88)
1937-Case Wheeler Act project request (Tr. 88)
1946-Bureau of Reclamation Report-Result of study
since 1928. (Tr. 104, Ex. 12)
1953-Bureau of Reclamation Report (Ex. 14)
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1957-Bureau of Reclamation Letter described as a preliminary report (Tr. 129, Ex. 15)
1958-Application to Utah Water and Power Board (Ex.
28)
Despite the efforts to promote the project there has never
been action taken on any report which resulted in making'
federal or state money available for project construction. In
factJ there is no evidence that a final plan for the project at
the rr Narrows site" has ever been formulated. In 1946, the
Regional Director transmitted to the Commissioner, Bureau of
Reclamation, a very detailed report on the Gooseberry project,
and recommended:
(2) Inasmuch as only a small portion of the project
construction cost can be repaid by the water users and
inasmuch as the project water supply is not assured,
development of the potential Gooseberry project not
be auth9rized at the present time. (Ex. 12, P. 8).
In 1953 the UNarrows site~' was discarded and the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Reclamation recommended a project
at the UMammoth site'' (located about 3 miles downstream
from the uNarrows site") which is not covered by application
No. 9 59 3. In 19 57 a preliminary report in letter form stated
that a project at the uMammoth site" was infeasible and the
uNarrows site" was suggested. No report has ever been approved.
A private engineer, Richard C. Hansen, was employed
by the defendant Association to do engineering work on the
Gooseberry project on February 11, 1958, just one month
before the expiration of the last extension (March 11, 1958) ·
8
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Mr. Hansen stated that immediately after his employment and
prior to March 11, 1958, he collected engineering data from
the Bureau of Reclamation; that he used the data to locate the
west portal of the proposed tunnel, and that he staked the
location on the ground (Tr. 156). Mr. Hansen testified that
when the staking and bulldozing was done at the west portal
in February and 1v1arch, 1958, there was six feet of snow on
the ground ( 1 r. 166) and he conceded that the Association
had no plans. He said, ttl concede the remark that we had no
plans, (Tr. 168). Mr. Hansen admitted that he had done
no engineering work on the dam and had done nothing on
water supply (Tr. 168).
Keith Hansen, the president of the Association, testified
that it is uncertain whether the Association will get money
to build the project from the Utah Water and Power Board,
and Bureau of Reclamation, or some other source, and that
there has been no approval of the project by either ag.ency
(Tr. 194, 195). He admitted that the Association had no
plans except for the tunnel (Tr. 203).
The plaintiff called Laurence C. Monson, a hydrographer~
employed by the state engineer for many years ( 1938-1956)
who testified that he had been familiar with Gooseberry
Creek since 1938, that he had made water measurements, and
that he had made a study of water rights (Tr. 220-224). Mr.
Monson further testified that he had studied water supply
records on the Price River to determine whether in each year
since 1945 there would be water available for application No.
9593 at the {(Narrows site" on Gooseberry Creek. T.he results
are tabulated below:

9
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Year

Water Av.ailable

1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957

None
None
None
Perhaps some
8040 ac. ft.
None
20,750 ac. ft.
None
None
None
None
35,790 ac. ft.

(Tr.
(Tr.
(Tr.
(Tr.
(Tr.
(Tr.
(Tr.
(Tr.
(Tr.
(Tr.
(Tr.
(Tr.

224)
224)
224)
225)
225)
225)
225)
225)
225)
225)
225)
225)

Mr. Monson Indicated that the foregoing tabulation was
base upon filling the Scofield Reservoir right of 30,000 acre
feet. The figures did not include filling direct flow rights that
are prior to application No. 9593 (Tr. 228). No loss by evaporation, seepage or canal losses were taken into consideration
(Tr. 229). The testimony on water supply is not contradicted.
Win Templeton, a consulting engineer of wide exp~ri
ence, testified that he had made a water supply study of the
Price River drainage area and that based upon that study he
had determined that there would be water available at the
Gooseberry site only in one year out of four (Tr. 252). He
said that, with water available in only one year out of four
the project would not be feasible. Mr. Templeton also testified
that it would take one year to make a preliminary survey of
the project and that, with drilling, the cost of such survey
would be $5,000.00 to $6,000.00 (Tr. 246, 247).
George Waterman, a Carbon County resident since 1908,
testified that he had taken measurements to determine water
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

losses in the Carbon Canal and thait the canal loss from the
head of the canal to his land was twenty-five per cent (Tr. 265).
Mr. Waterman said that on March 12, 1958, he went to the
west portal of the proposed tunnel and observed the work
that had been done and talked to the tCCat" operator. The
operator told him that the 12th of March tCWas his fourth
day" and that uhe possibly put in an average of four, maybe
five hours a day" (Tr. 269). Exhibit 32 is a photograph showing
the work at the West portal.
It was stipulated by the parties that the record may show
that the appellants and the intervenor are the owners of substantially all of the decreed water rights on the Price River
set out in the Morse decree of 1910 (Tr. 213). Exhibit 32,
which is a copy of application No. 13,334 filed on Feb:uary
13, 1940 was received in evidence. This application is for
the appropriation of 50 second feet of water from Cabin
Hollow Creek in the Price River drainage and is subsequent
in priority to application No. 9593. Also, Exhibit 33, being
a very excellent and comprehensive report of water supply
for Price City, dated Decen1ber, 1957, prepared by Templeton
and Link, consulting engineers, was received in evidence. This
report contains a tabulation and analysis of water rights on
Price River.
The trial court made no findings of fact to support a conclusion of law that the applicant had been diligent or that
there was reasonable cause for delay. Paragraph 8 and 9 of
the Findings of Fact state:
8. Under all the facts and circumstances in this case,

Defendant Sanpete Water Users' Association has shown
11
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reasonable diligence in proceeding to prove up on its
application and to put the water to beneficial use.
9. The_ court further finds that said Sanpete Water
Users' Association has shown reasonable cause for
delay in constructing the entire works and diverting
the water to the lands in Sanpete Valley (R. 27).
'

.

The decree granted an extension of time to prove up on
application No. 9593 for a per~od of two years from the date
nthat this order shall become :final by lapse of time in which
to file an appeal therefrom or in the event an appeal is taken
to the Supreme Court, from the date of the issuance by said
Court of the remittitur on final judgment affirming this judgment" (R. 30) . This appeal is taken from the decree.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The applicant has not made a ((proper showing of dili-

gence" on application No. 9593 within the meaning of Section
73-3-12, U.C.A. 1953.
2. There has been no nproper showing of reasonable cause

for delay."
3. There are no findings of fact of diligence or reasonable
cause for delay which support the decree.

ARGUMENT
DILIGENCE HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN.
It is settled that when a suit is filed pursuant to Section
73-3-12, U.C.A., 1953, to review a decision of the state engi12
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neer, the district court must in a trial de novo consider and
decide the same questions as those to be considered and decided
by the state engineer. Upon appeal the same issues are before
this Court. Eardley v. Terry, 94 U. 367, 77 P 2d, 362.
The pertinent part of the statute involved in this appeal
provides:
73-3-12. The construction of the works and the
application of water to beneficial use shall be diligently prosecuted to completion within the time
fixed by the state engineer.. Extensions of. time, not
exceeding fifty yeftrS from the date of approval of the
application, may be granted by the state ~engineer on
proper showing of diligence or reasonable · cause for
delay. Extensions .not exceeding fourteen years after
the date of approval may- be granted· by the state
engineer upon a ·sufficient showing by affidavit. But
extensions beyond fourteen years shall be granted only
after application, publication of notice, and a hearing
before the state engineer.
·
It will.be noted that the word uor" is used. The applicant
must, .therefore, make· a proper showing of diligence_, or of
reasonable cause for de.lay; otherwise, its request for extension
must be denied. These were the issues before the state engineer
and before the district court.
In discussing this question, we shall first treat briefly the
fundamentals of the water law which require diligence as a
condition to c c relating back'' the priority of the right, and the
cases construing statutes which authorize extensions of time.
Section 73-3-12 was ·enacted to put into statutory form
and to make definite and certain the cc doctrine of relation"
which 1s that if an ·appropriator, after initiating his appro13
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priation, proceeds diligent! y to construct the necessary diversion
and control facilities and to put the water to beneficial use,
the priority for all water appropriated, pursuant to the original
scheme, will relate back to the date of original appropriation.
The object of statutory provisions similar to the Utah
statute is well discussed in I Wiel on Water Rights in the
Western States, 3rd Edition, on pages 398, 399:
368. Object of Statutory Provisions. - The early
customs out of which the law of appropriation grew
were based (as has been already discussed) on the
principle that rights on the public domain were open
to all, the first possessor being protected; and that all,
also, should have an equal chance. As is said in Nevada etc. Co. v. Kidd, they did not countenance anyone
acting ccthe dog in the manger." Many attempted to
secure monopoly of waters by merely posting notices
or making a pretense at building canals, ditches, etc.,
and tried by this means to hold a right to the water
against later comers who bona fide sought to construct
the necessary works for its use. From those conditions
grew up a method of making an appropriation to apply
specifically to rival claimants while the construction
work, often prolonged, was going on. If the first comer
bona fide and diligently prosecuted his work, his right
on its completion related back to the very beginning
of it; otherwise the others were preferred. This method
of making the appropriation was, under the early decisions, substantially the same as that now provided
for this purpose, in the Civil Code of California. The
provisions of the Civil Code of California are merely
to fix the procedure whereby a certain definite time
might be established as the date at which title should
accrue by relation.
369. Provisions Chiefly Declaratory Only.-In codifying the rules governing this method in California

14
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(and the early statutes of other States based thereon),
the rules laid down in the decisions of the court were
not materially changed; for the whole code upon this
subject is substantially only declaratory of the preexisting law.
The same author discusses the meaning of the word
"diligence" as used in statutes similar to ours on page 415 of
Volume 1:
Diligence does not require unusual or extraordinary
efforts, but only such constancy and steadiness of purpose or of labor as is usual with men engaged in like
enterprises. Matters incident to the person and not to
the enterprise are not such circumstances as will excuse great delay in the work. In one case, for two years
work was done on the ditch for three months only,
and the court said: ((Diligence is defined to be the
(steady application to business of any kind, constant
effort to accomplish any undertaking.' " The law does
not require any unusual or extraordinary effort, but
only that which is usual, ordinary, and reasonable. The
diligence required in cases of this kind is that constancy and steadiness of purpose or labor which is usual
with men engaged in like enetrprises, and who desire
a speedy accomplishment of their designs. Such assiduity in the prosecution of the enterprise as will manifest to the world a bona fide intention to complete it
within a reasonable time. It is the doing of an act, or
series of acts, with all practical expedition, with no
delay, except such as may be incident to the work ...
Rose during this time may have dreamed of his canal
completed, seen it with his mind's eye yielding him a
great revenue; he may have indulged the hope of providenti,al interference in his favor, but this cannot be
called a diligent prosecution of his enterprise.
The doctrine of relation is well defined in the early Colorado case of Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 2 P. 901, as follows:

15
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Alt.hough the appropriation is not deemed complete
until the actual diversion or use of water, still if such
work be prosecuted · with reasonable . diligence, the
right relates back to the time when the first step was
taken.
The case of Ophir Silver Min. Co. v. Carpenter~ 4 Nev.
·534, decided in January, 1869, involved an application of the
doctrine of relation to the facts. The evidence showed that
a water appropriation was initiated in 1858. We quote:
Thus, it appears, th3:t from the fall of 1859 to the
· summer o~ ~862, a period of over two years and a half,
work was done upon the ditch for about three months
.only; that _was during the year 1861 when Rose testifies
that from seventeen to twenty men were employed.These facts, it is argued on behalf of defendants, show
. such diligence on the part of their grantor in the prosecution of his ~riginal design as to make their right to
the quantity of water now diverted by them relate to
the time when Rose in the year 1858 qid the first act
toward appropriation.--In our judgment those facts
exhibit an utter want of diligence in the prosecution
of the design _wh~ch it is claimed was undertaken by
Rose. (Emphasis added.)
The cases uniforn1l y hold that mere lack of means with
which to prosecute work is never, ipso- facto, a sufficient excuse
for delay by an appropria~or -in applying water to _beneficial
use. Maricopa County Mun. Water Cons. District v. Southwest
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P. 2d, 369.
·
The Supreme Court of New Mexico had occasion in the
case of Rio Puerco Irrigation Company v. Jastro, 19 N.M. 149,
141 P. 874, to construe a statute sin1ilar to ours which provided:
Section 29. The construction of the works shall be
diligently prosecuted to completion
"
t t
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The application for appropriation of water was filed on
August 28, 1907. The application was approved on July 21,
1908 .and the Territorial Engineer required that work be commenced by Nlarch 1, 1909; that one-fifth of the work be completed on or before January 1, 1910, and that all work be
completed before July 21, 1912. Upon timely application, the
engineer extended the time to commence and complete the
work for an additional 3-months period. A secohd request
for extension was filed on May 25, 1909~
The applicant made a showing. that it had been unable
to sell bonds which it proposed to issue, and, because of such
fact did not have the money to enable it to begin and prosecute
the work. The board of water commissioners refused to grant
an extension of time and the applicant appealed to the District
Court which affirmed. The case was· then ap.pealed to the
Supreme Court and that Court affirmed. The Court held that
the statute was declaratory of the law as it existed prior to its
enactment and stated:
The doctrine of relation has been universally applied by the courts, in arid states, in the appropriation
of water. Where notice is required by statute of the
intention to appropriate, the right relates back to the
time such notice is given, in the authorized manner;
in the absence of a statute, requiring notice, or other
act, the right relates back to the time when the first
step was taken. This doctrine does not apply, or protect the intending appropriator, however, unless he
prosecutes his work of diversion with reasonable diligence.
The authorities all agree that the mere lack of means
with which to prosecute the work is not a suffic.ient
excuse of delay. As was said by the Supreme Court of
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Nevada, in the case of Ophir Silver Mining Co. v.
Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534, 97 Am. Dec. 550:
It would be a most dangerous doctrine to hold
that the ill health or pecuniary inability of a claimant of a water privilege will dispense with the
necessity of actual appropriation within a reasonable time, or the diligence which is usually required in the prosecution of the work necessary for
the purpose. We find no recognition of such doctrine in the law. Nor are we disposed to adopt it
as the rule to govern cases of this kind.
See, also, Cole v. Logan, 24 Or. 304, 33 Pac. 568;
Keeney v. Carillo, 2 N. M. 480; Kinney on Irrigation
& Water Rights (2nd Ed.) 739.
Such being the law, in the absence of statutory regulations, the only remaining question is whether it was
the intention of our lawmakers to change this rule ...
Financial inability is not under the statute, as it was
not without the statute, such a cause as will excuse lack
of diligence in the prosecution of the work. Hence it
necessarily follows that the territorial engineer was
not authorized to grant an extension of time within
which to complete one-fifth of the work, or all of the
work, where the only basis for the request was the
financial inability of the intending appropriator or
his inability to sell bonds with which to procure money
to prosecute the work, and the district court properly
refused the requested extension of time.
Our statute, like the New Mexico statute, was enacted to
declare the doctrine of relation under which financial inability
to construct the works was not a sufficient excuse for delay.
In the Oregon case of In re White River, 155 Or. 148,
62 P. 2d 22, the Supreme Court considered the same question
as is presented here- whether an applicant for water had
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shown sufficient diligence to justify an extension of time. It
appeared from the evidence that the applicant had had two
previous extensions and was without funds to construct the
project. The court held that the applicant had not shown
diligence and denied the extension.
The following cases involve the question of diligence and
the application of the doctrine of relation. They support the
reasoning and conclusions above.
Colorado etc. Co. v. Rocky Ford etc. Co., 3 Colo.
App. 545, 34 P. 580.
Seaweard v. Pacific Livestock Co., 49 Or. 157, 88 P.
963.
Still v. Palouse Irrigation Co., 64 Wash. 606, 117 P.
466.
Cole v. Logan, 24 Or. 304, 33 P. 568.
Low v. Rizor, 25 Or. 551, 37 P. 82.
An analysis of the evidence, briefly summarized above,
establishes the following:
1. No plan for construction of the work has been finally

adopted by the applicant.
2. With no plan it is apparent that there has been no

ttconstancy or steadiness of purpose" in constructing works.
Except for small amounts spent for ttsubterfuge" purposes,
there has been no showing that the sponsors of the project
have made any investment whatever, or, indeed, have done
anything except to promote the spending of money by others.
3. The history of this project shows procrastination and
delay for 34 years.
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The foregoing will be briefly discussed in the order stated
above.
1. The applicant has never had a final, approved plan

for ·construction of works and for application of water to
beneficial use. Numerous ((plans" have been considered 'by
the Bureau o£ Reclamation over the years. Several repqrts have
been prepared and as far as the writers know, a feasible plan
has never yet been produced by anyone, aJthough intermittent
study by government agencies has gone on for more than 30
yeats. At least -two principal plans have been studied ( 1) the
so-called Mammoth Plan covered· by the 1953 -Bureau of
Reclamation report, which provides for a dam some 3 miles
below the point of diversion described in application No.
9593, and (2) the plan for construction of a d~m at the
((Narrows Site" described in application No. 9593. Exhibit
15- offered by ·the applicant indicates that due to the increase
in construction costs the so-called ((Mammoth Plan" has a
benefit-cost ratio of less than unity. The same letter suggests
a plan for diversion of only 6,300-acre feet of water to Sanpete
County and indicates that the _project area would b~ reduced
from 16,400 acres to 3,630 which would receive a supplement~!
supply with a reduction of costs from $5,367,000.00 to
$2,204,000.00. By simple division the cost of water· for supplemental use would be $607.00 per acre. This letter from the
Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation indicates,
on itse face, that it is subject to revision.' The evidence shows
that it is merely a suggestion and has not been approved (Tr.
129).
The original application describes a point· in Section 24,
Twp. 13 S., R. 5 E., S.L.B.M. (See Exhibit 2). In 1941, change
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application A -1600 was filed to change the point of diversion
from the point described above to a point in Section 6, Twp.
13 S., R. 6 E., S.L.B. & M. The change application has not
been advertised. It has been dormant for 17 years, indicating
that the applicant does not yet know where the project will
be built.
We believe that the applicant is relying upon the activity
of the Bureau of Reclamation to support a showing of diligence.
The Bureau of Reclamation has not done any construction work
nor has it done anything except to make surveys and do exploration work to determine whether a project is feasible.
Although the Utah Congressional Delegation has in the past
actively supported the Gooseberry Project, no appropriations
have been made because of one thing. The reports do not
indicate that the project is feasible. Exhibit 15 shows that the
benefits (which are liberally presented) , are less than the cost.
If the applicant is right, and the Bureau surveys should be
considered to show diligence, the applicant would be in the
position of urging that surveys showing an infeasible project
should be treated by the state engineer as construction work
to support an extension of time for constructing the project.
The fundamental unsoundness of the applicant's position is
abundantly clear.
To summarize, there is no showing that the applicant
has ever made a complete engtneering study at its own expense,
but has been content to wait for some government agency to
come up with something and place it in its lap. The witness,
Hansen, said that he had studied the tunnel but had done
nothing with respect to the water supply or the dam. The
application has been pending for 34 years without a plan
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and without location of the site. No actual work has been
done except to remove snow and ((scratch" at the west tunnel
portal to make a showing of diligence. This will be discussed
more fully below.
2. The texts and cases cited above indicate that diligence
includes na constancy or steadiness of purpose in constructing
work." After 34 years the applicant has not yet got a plan, so
obviously there could be no showing of constancy or steadiness
of purpose except in the promotion line. If desire for planning
at the expense of others and promotion of appropriations by
the government were to be considered diligence, there has been
a showing of that in abundance. But that is not the law.
A frantic effort was made to show actual construction
the last few days before the expiration of the applicant's
time, for filing proof. After a lapse of 33 years, in the middle
of the winter, and when there was six feet of snow on the
ground, the applicant decided the time was ripe to commence
the tunnel; and without a plan or financial ability to continue
work, caused a patch of snow to be removed from the mountainside, and a small excavation to be made, for no purpose
other than to make a showing in support of the request for
extension. This is not a sufficient showing to meet the requirements of the law. The work required by the statute is work
so substantial in character as to manifest good faith and intent
to exercise reasonable diligence in the completion of the
project. Morse v. Gold Beach Water Co., 160 Or. 301, 84 P.
2d 113. I am sure this Court will not be fooled by this obvious
effort at subterfuge.
3. The history of the application is rather fully related
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above and will not be repeated. It is a story of delay-a story
of "waiting for the breaks" to get a project financed with a
large subsidy. The fact is that the history of the application
is long because the project is not financially sound and there
is an inadequate water supply as will be demonstrated under
the next heading.
REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY HAS NOT BEEN
SHOWN.
It is apparent that the question of whether there has been
reasonable cause for delay must depend upon the facts and
circumstances.
The feasibility of the project must necessarily be considered in connection ,·vith (treasonable cause for delay." It
would be extremely unsound for the Court to grant an extension
for construction of a project which is clearly infeasible as is
the case here. It is unreasonable to tie up the water of the
Price River for a project which is obviously too expensive
to build. After more than 30 years of intensive study under
every federal program which has come along (see testimony
of Thomas Jenson, Tr. 87-92) the defendant points to the
letter of the Regional Director as the basis for a ((plan" and as
indicated above that plan would cost $607.00 per acre for
supplemental water (not a full supply) .
The feasibility must also- be considered from the standpoint of water supply. Engineer Laurence C. Monson testified
that in nine years out of the last twelve years, there was
no water in Gooseberry Creek available for storage over and
above that required to satisfy the primary storage and direct
23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

flow rights (Tr. 224-228). Any idea that holdover storage
would carry the irrigators over a dry spell is unsound. The
records show without contradiction that during the three-year
period, 1946, 1947 and 1948, there was absolutely no water
available for storage at the Gooseberry site (Tr. 224). During
the four-year period from 1953 to 1956 inclusive there was
no water (Tr. 225).
The lack of a qependable water supply at the Gooseberry
site is given as a reason for rejection of the project proposed
by application No. 9593 in the 1953 Bureau of Reclamation
report, Exhibit 14. On page 21 it is stated:
ALTERNATIVE PLANS OF DEVELOPMENT
42. The Gooseberry project outlined in this report
was selected as the most desirable means for developing
the area after consideration of several alternative plans.
Study was given to three possibilities, besides the adopted
plan, for diverting Price River water to Sanpete Valley.
All of these alternatives were rejected} however, because of excessive costs for the benefits received or
unstable water supply. One of the plans involved
storage of Gooseberry Creek waters at the Mammoth
site as in the adopted plan but with the addition of
feeder canals to bring water to the reservoir from the
headwaters of Huntington Creek and from Cabin
Hollow Creek, tributary to Gooseberry Creek below
the dam site. Water would be diverted to Cottonwood
Creek as in the adopted plan. Another plan involved
a reservoir at the Gooseberry site about 3 miles above
the Mamomth site and a transmountain dive1'sion tunnel from the reservoir to Cottonwood Creek. This
plan would utilize water of Gooseberry Creek as well
as water from tributaries of Huntington Creek that
would be brought to Gooseberry Creek by feeder
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canals. 1'he third plan involved no storage. The unregulated flow of Gooseberry Creek would be conveyed
to Cottonwood Creek through a diversion tunnel. (Emphasis added.)
In the 1957 letter of the Regional Director, Exhibit 15,
the following appears:
The costs for the J.\!Iammoth plan as presented in the
195 3 report, when increased to present-day prices, reduced the benefit-cost ratio for the project to less than
unity. Also, under the 19 53 plan, a serious question,
which we have previous! y discussed with you, as to
water available for the Scofield Reservoir when 11,700
acre feet of water was diverted from the Price River
for the Go~seberry Project.
An explanation as to how rising construction costs would
make the rejected nNarrows Plan" feasible, and would make
the ((Mammoth Plan" infeasible would have been interesting
indeed. None was attempted.
Engineer Win 'Templeton testified that in his op1n1on
the project was infeasible because of inadequacy of the water
supply (Tr. 252). He also testified that with the drill holes
and topographic survey of the Bureau available for use that
engineers could ma~e a preliminary study of the project to
determine its approximate cost and feasibility in a couple of
months. He said one year would be adequate for the study
and surveys necessary for construction (Tr. 246-247). This
testimony is not contradicted. The applicants have had 34
years since the application was filed and 20 years since it was
app1'oved and have not even got a plan.
It is the duty of the Court as it was the duty of the state
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engineer to carefully consider a request for extension of time
with the following important matters in mind:
1. Is the project physically and financially sound so that

if the extension is granted, that there is reasonable
assurance of success?
2. The extent, if any, of investments in the works pro-

posed by the project.
3. The cost of the project and the cost of the remaining
works to be constructed.
4. The reasons for delay and assurance that the works will
be completed within the extended period.
If this approach to the problem is used (and it is fundamentally sound), what is the result? The answers are pretty
obvious:
1. There is no plan. The feasibility of the plan cannot be

considered because the applicant itself does not know
what it is.
2. The applicant has made no investments except in con-

nection with the frantic effort at subterfuge which
obviously should not be considered.
3. No one knows what the cost will be because there is
no plan.
4. The reason for delay is that during the past 34 years,
with a liberal expenditure of public funds, no one has
yet con1e up with a reasonable plan. There is no reason
to believe that with rising construction costs there will
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be better success in the next 2 years or in the next 5
years.
The statute speaks of (treasonable cause for delay." It is
obvious that there is no (treasonable cause" where the project
is infeasible because of the inadequacy of the water supply
and excessive costs. There is no dispute in the evidence. The
testimony of Engineers Templeton and Monson is not contradicted. In fact, it is corroborated by the above quoted
excerpt from the comprehensive Bureau report, Exhibit 14,
page 21, which rejects the ((Narrows site project" because of
Hexcessive costs" and ({unstable water supply."
The reason the appellants vigorously oppose further extensions of time is clear. According to Mr. Monson's detailed
analysis if the water covered by application No. 9593 should
be stored at the ((Narrows site" and taken to Sanpete Valley
there would be a shortage on the Carbon County side of the
mountain in at least 8 years out of 12. This is confirmed by
Mr. Templeton. See Exhibit 33, page 77, where it is stated:
4. The Gooseberry Project cannot be built without
usurping Carbon County water rights with resulting
damage to the industrial future of the area. It is doubtful if the Gooseberry Project could ever repay more
than ten cents on each dollar of construction cost,
while industrial use of water in Carbon County will
result in immeasurable benefits to the State of Utah
and the United States of America.
Water applications subsequent to No. 9593 owned by the
appellants and the intervenor will, of course, be firmed up if
the request for extension should be denied.
No facts have been produced which could be considered
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reasonable cause for delay. On the contrary, the evidence shows
good reasons for denying the applicant's request. The facts
of lack of an adequate water supply and excessive costs are
not disputed. The applicant cannot point to a single report
after more than 30 years investigation which would justify
a further extension.
THERE ARE NO FINDINGS OF FACT OF DILIGENCE
OR REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY WHICH SUPPORT .THE DECREE.
Rule 52 (a) insofar as pertinent provides:
In all ·actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall, unless the same
are waived, find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry
of the appropriate judgment .
0

0

The law is well settled in this jurisdiction that written
findings of facts and conclusions of law, separately stated,
must be filed before any judgment can be entered. It is said
that they are, nthe foundations of the judgment." Reich v.
Rebellion Silver Min. Co., 3 U. 254, 2 P. 703; In re Thompson's
Estate, 72 U. 17, 35; 269 P. 103; In the case of Gaddis Inv.
Co. v. Morrison, 3 U. 2d 43, 278 Po 2d 284, this Court stated:
It has been frequently held that the failure of the
trial court to make findings of fact on all material
issues is reversible error where it is prejudicial. (Many
cases are cited) o
The findings of fact consist of findings that certain
plaintiffs are corporations and n1unicipal corporations and
that the applicant is a corporation and Wayne D. Criddle is
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the state engineer; that application No. 9593 was filed and
rejected; that an appeal was taken to the district court; that
on February 11, 1939, the district court determined that the
action of the state engineer ttwas arbitrary and in violation
of the rights of the plaintiff''; that between the date of the
decision and 1958 the applicant and its predecesors had sought
and been granted extensions of time in which to prove up on
application No. 9593; that the applicant had requested and
the state engineer had granted a further extension to March
31, 1961, and the plaintiffs had filed this action for review.
The court then finds:

7. The said determination and order of the Defendant
State Engineer granting an extep.sion of time was and
is supported by the evidence and should be affirmed
except as hereinafter indicated.
8. Under all the facts and circumstances in this case,
Defendant Sanpete Water Users' Association has shown
reasonable diligence in proceeding to prove up on its
application and to put the water to beneficial use.

9. The court further finds that said Sanpete Water
Users Association has shown reasonable cause for delay
in constructing the entire works and diverting the water
to the lands in Sanpete Valley.
The findings set out in full above are the only findings
on ~e issues of diligence or reasonable cause for delay which
are the only issues in the case. It is clear that paragraphs 7,
8 and 9 are conclusions. No facts are actually found. There
is no finding of any fact which constitutes diligence and there
is no finding of facts which would entitle the court to conclude
that there is reasonable cause for delay. The trial court has
totally ignored the requirements of Rule 52 (a) . The fact of
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the matter is that no facts were found because none were
adduced which would support a finding that the applicant
had diligently proceeded to construct works and apply water
to beneficial use as intended by section 73-3-12. Likewise, with
an infeasible project on its hands, the court could not very
well find facts showing a reasonable cause for delay. The
decree is therefore without foundation and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Section 73-3-12, which codifies the doctrine of relation,
permits the state engineer to grant extensions of time for
making proof of construction of works and application of
water to beneficial use. If a proper showing of either diligence
or reasonable cause for delay is made the state engineer may
grant extensions and may thus enable the applicant to retain
its original priority. It is apparent that the applicant has failed
to make such showing because not only has no construction
work been done •
after some 34 years but the applicant has
not even formulated an approved plan of construction. Uncontradicted expert testimony indicates that engineering studies
could have been accomplished in one year. Furthermore, the
evidence also demonstrates that the project is financially infeasible and that there is an inadequate water supply. Finally,
no facts of diligence or reasonable cause for delay are found
in the findings of fact and the decree is without foundation.
It is respectfully subn1itted that the decree herein must
be reversed.
E. J. SKEEN
THERALD N. JENSEN

Attorneys for Appellants
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